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Preface
Three aspects of super-recursive algorithms and
hypercomputation or %nding black swans
Our engraved knowledge may bite into our thinking
certain errors that become well-nigh ineradicable.
Rogers MacVeagh and Thomas Costain “Joshua”
History of science and technology proves that the biggest advances come not from
doing more and bigger and faster of what is already being done, but from new ideas,
discoveries, and starting points. Hence this special issue concerns new ideas, discov-
eries, and metaphors in computer science. It is not about incremental improvements,
but rather it presents the opportunities opened by these related notions: super-recursive
algorithms and hypercomputation.
Together these new ideas, discoveries, constructions, and metaphors form a new
computer science %eld, the theory of super-recursive algorithms and hypercomputation.
It is a part of such established domain as the theory of algorithms, automata, and
computation.
One main achievement of 20th century scienti%c thought is the theory of algo-
rithms and computation. This theory studies abstract and real automata, computers and
networks, computation and communication. In many ways, this theory is the central
cornerstone for computer science. Many key accomplishments in the theory of algo-
rithms and computation converge to the famous Church–Turing thesis, a statement
determining the boundaries of algorithmic computations. The Church–Turing thesis has
long been considered as the most fundamental law within computing. However, recent
developments in the theory of algorithms allow overcoming limitations in the Church–
Turing thesis. New mathematical models for algorithms and computation have appeared
that extend prior theory in a manner similar to the way relativity theory and quantum
mechanics went beyond Newtonian mechanics. These new models are more powerful
than the classical recursive algorithm models, i.e., Turing machines, partial recursive
functions, Lambda-calculus, and cellular automata.
Algorithms and automata that are more powerful than Turing machines are called
super-recursive.
Computations that cannot be realized or simulated by Turing machines are called
hypercomputations.
The new area of computer science called the theory of super-recursive algorithms
and hypercomputation consists of several directions. The most important ones are
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listed here in chronological order: inductive computations and inference, computations
and recursive functions with real numbers, interactive and concurrent computations,
topological computations, in%nite time computations, and neural networks with real
number parameters. Each of these algorithmic and computational models supplies a
new logic of computation. Together they extended the scope of computer science.
There were two conferences directed at problems of the theory of super-recursive
algorithms and hypercomputation. The %rst, The Hypercomputation Workshop took
place in London, May 24, 2000. It was a one-day workshop jointly supported by the
Turing Project and the Philosophy Department of the University of Reading and orga-
nized by Jack Copeland and John Preston. The second, “Beyond the Classical Bound-
aries of Computation” was a two-day four-panel Session of the American Mathematical
Society Meeting in San Francisco, May 2003.
Results in superrecursive algorithms and hyper-computation represent advances in
the theoretical computer science domain. This special issue presents recent research
in the area through thirteen papers that reCect diDerent areas in the theory of super-
recursive algorithms and hypercomputation. They are separated into four natural sec-
tions, going from more constructive to more abstract approaches:
I. Inductive and fuzzy algorithms and computation.
II. Inﬁnite time and continuous models.
III. Logical and algebraic models.
IV. Methodological and philosophical aspects of super-recursive algorithms and hyper-
computation.
Within the sections, the papers are ordered according to their submission date. Not
all papers in this issue reCect opinions of the Editors of this issue on algorithms, com-
putation, and their mathematical models. However, their publication supports scienti%c
exchange, by exposing crucial problems, expressing diDerent (sometimes contrasting)
opinions, and suggesting non-trivial ideas for discussion. All papers have been duly ref-
ereed to comply with the high standards of the Journal “Theoretical Computer Science”
and the best papers have been selected for this special issue.
In the paper of Peter Kugel “Toward a Theory of Machine Intelligence”, super-
recursive algorithms and hypercomputation are studied in the context of problems of
natural and arti%cial intelligence. DiDerent algorithmic models of intelligence based
on recursive and inductive computational modes are considered and compared with
respect to their cognitive abilities. Currently, the theory of super-recursive algorithms
and hypercomputation uses two terms, limiting and inductive computation, to indicate
a stabilizing computational process. The term limiting computation %rst appeared in
the pioneering paper of Gold [10]. However, this term gives a wrong impression. It
implicitly implies that such processes demand in%nite time and number of computa-
tional steps to obtain a result. Contrary to this, any computation of this type gives
its result after some %nite time interval and demands a %nite number of simple steps
[7]. At the same time, the computational process in question works like induction by
accumulating intermediary results to produce the %nal result at some step. Thus, the
term inductive computation is more accurate.
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In 1950, Turing wrote that computers could be programmed to behave intelligently,
but only if we enable them to do more than compute. In this paper, Kugel uses a mathe-
matical model of intelligence to clarify Turing’s suggestion. Obtained results bring him
to the conclusion that it is probably better to try to provide that “more” by developing
new software (that will allow computers to run super-recursive algorithms) than by
developing new hardware (that will allow us to turn computers into hypercomputers).
However, Kugel does not stop obtaining interesting results for inductive compu-
tation. He formulates several prospective directions for the development of arti%cial
intelligence and its application to computer science and software technology.
In his paper “Characterizing the Super-Turing Computing Power and E0ciency of
Classical Fuzzy Turing Machines,” Jiri Wiedermann introduces and studies accepting
fuzzy Turing machines with the same structure as conventional Turing machines, but
in which each step of computation is performed with some truth degree. This concept
formalizes the idea of Zadeh of a fuzzy algorithm. If we take all computations of
fuzzy Turing machines, we obtain a new class of non-deterministic Turing machines.
It is known that these machines have the same computing and accepting power as
deterministic Turing machine. However, a distinction between diDerent levels of the
acceptation truth degree, we essentially extend the power of these machines. They
become models of super-recursive algorithms, hence are capable of performing hyper-
computation. The author proves that fuzzy languages accepted by these machines with a
computable t-norm correspond exactly to the union L01 ∪M01 of recursively enumerable
languages and their complements. The second main result of the paper states that
the complexity class of polynomially time-bounded computations of such machines
coincides with the union NP ∪ co-NP from the %rst level of the polynomial hierarchy.
In his paper “Algorithmic complexity of recursive and inductive algorithms” Mark
Burgin continues his research of inductive computations. There are three main types
of inductive processes:
Cognitive induction when the problem is either to %nd some properties of a given
object=system or to %nd an object=system that has some given properties. Conventional
methods of inductive inference give examples of cognitive induction.
Constructive induction [13] consists of a search when the process of %nding an object
or system with given properties is accomplished by a search domain transformation.
Inductive inference with optimization of the search domain gives examples of cognitive
induction.
Inductive construction involves a problem of building an object or system that sat-
is%es some given properties. Computations by inductive Turing machines are a kind
of inductive construction.
The paper “Algorithmic complexity of recursive and inductive algorithms” compares
recursive algorithms such as Turing machines with such super-recursive algorithms as
inductive Turing machines (ways to realize inductive computations). This comparison
is made in a general setting of dual complexity measures such as Kolmogorov or
algorithmic complexity. To make adequate comparison, it becomes necessary to recon-
sider the standard axiomatic approach to complexity of algorithms. The new approach
allows the author to achieve a more adequate representation of static system complex-
ity in the axiomatic context. This result demonstrates that for solving many problems
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inductive Turing machines have much lower complexity than Turing machines and
other recursive algorithms. This aNrms that inductive Turing machines are not only
more powerful, but also more eNcient than Turing machines.
Mark Burgin and Allen Klinger, in their paper “ Experience, Generations, and Lim-
its in Machine Learning,” study problems of machine learning in a setting of super-
recursive algorithms. They extend traditional models of machine learning beyond their
one-level structure by introducing previously obtained problem knowledge into the al-
gorithm or automaton involved. Some authors studied models that utilize some kind of
predetermined knowledge, having a two-level structure. However, even in this case, the
model has not reCected the source and inherited properties of predetermined knowl-
edge. In society, knowledge is often transmitted from previous generations. The aim
of this paper is to construct and study algorithmic models of learning processes that
utilize predetermined or prior knowledge. The models use recursive, subrecursive, and
super-recursive algorithms. Predetermined knowledge includes: a text description, ac-
tivity rules (e.g., for cognition), and speci%c structured individual or social memory.
Algorithmic models represent these three forms as separate structured processing sys-
tems: automata with (1) advice; (2) structured program; and (3) structured memory.
That yields three basic models for learning systems: polynomially bounded Turing
machines, Turing machines, and inductive Turing machines of the %rst order. It is
demonstrated that only inductive Turing machines allow a learner to increase cognitive
power through transmitted knowledge utilization.
In his paper “Hypercomputation with Quantum Adiabatic Processes,” Tien D Kieu
discusses an alternative approach to quantum computation. The standard approach
is based on linear superposition and entanglement that give quantum computation its
power and eNciency. However, computational power of abstract quantum computers
(real quantum computers still do not exist) does not surpass the power of ordinary
Turing machines [8]. Tien D Kieu suggests a quantum algorithm based on the Quan-
tum Adiabatic Theorem. He shows how this algorithm solves Hilbert’s 10th problem
(although it is proved unsolvable by standard mathematical methods). Since standard
mathematical methods can achieve no more than an ordinary Turing machine, this
shows that adiabatic quantum computations are theoretically more powerful than stan-
dard quantum computations.
It is interesting that Kieu suggests that the halting of a quantum universal Turing
machine is highly problematic. This brings us to necessity of modeling quantum com-
puters with super-recursive algorithms, such as inductive and limit Turing machines.
In his paper “Super-Tasks, Accelerating Turing Machines and Uncomputability,”
Oron Shagrir discusses problems of accelerating Turing machines, abstract devices that
have the same computational structure as Turing machines, but can perform super-tasks.
The author argues that performing super-tasks makes accelerating Turing machines
essentially diDerent in comparison with ordinary Turing machines.
The reason is that to have a full description of an algorithm or abstract automaton=
machine A, we must:
1. Describe the structure of A (the static structure).
2. Describe how each step of computation of A is performed (the dynamic structure).
3. Describe how a result is obtained (the end structure).
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This implies the following consequences for accelerating machines:
1. Accelerating machines may have the static structure of an ordinary Turing machine.
In this case, it is possible to call them accelerating Turing machines.
2. Accelerating Turing machines can be diDerent from ordinary Turing machines
because they have diDerent end structure. So, they are not ordinary Turing
machines.
3. However, to be precise, it is necessary to describe explicitly the end structure of
accelerating Turing machines. There are diDerent ways to de%ne the end structures.
One possibility is to use the end structure of an inductive Turing machine or limiting
partial recursive function (e.g., [7]). Another possibility is to use the end structure of
an in%nite time Turing machine (e.g., [11]). One more possibility is to use the end
structure of a limit Turing machine [4]. Moreover, even for an accelerating Turing
machine, it is possible to de%ne such end structure that will make it equivalent to
an ordinary Turing machine.
Bruce MacLennan in his paper “Natural computation and non-Turing models of
computation,” gives a critique of ordinary Turing machines and suggests a new ap-
proach called natural computation. He de%nes natural computation as computation
occurring in nature or inspired by that in nature. This de%nition makes no commitment
as to whether discrete or continuous models are preferable. This is an empirical is-
sue, and no doubt diDerent instances of natural computation will require diDerent sorts
of models. Since the theory of discrete computation is more developed, MacLennan
focuses on continuous models, and in particular on 7eld computation.
One of the shortcomings of the traditional model of computation is that it is oriented
toward potential unbounded complexity, that is, how utilization of some resource (typ-
ically time or space) grows with the size of the input. Such analysis is less relevant in
the context of natural computation, since the size of the input is generally %xed (e.g.,
by the structure or anatomy of a sensory system). Natural computational models allow
one to use other criteria for comparison of algorithms: speed of response, generality
of response, 8exibility in response to novelty, adaptability, tolerance to noise, error,
faults, and damage.
While other approaches to continuous and topological computations (Shannon, Pour-
El, Rubel, Moore, Blum et al., Burgin) give diDerent models of continuous and topo-
logical computations, MacLennan develops foundations for the theory of continuous
and topological computations and algorithms, utilizing an axiomatic approach. As a
result, he achieves higher level of theory than other authors who worked in this area.
For a general theory of computations and algorithms, axiomatic systems are developed
in [3].
One of the main axioms (Postulate 4) suggested by MacLennan for continuous and
topological computations states that mappings between image spaces, that is, elementary
computational operations, are continuous. It is possible to extend this axiom assuming
that such operations are only fuzzy continuous [5]. This better reCects properties of
natural computation. For instance, the ability to adapt gradually to novelty implies
that physical representations of natural computational processes are at least partially
continuous. In addition, fuzzy continuity of computational operations allows one to
include continuous and discrete computations in the same axiomatic setting.
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In his paper “Continuous time computation with restricted integration capabilities,”
Manuel Lameiras Campagnolo develops further the recursion theory on real numbers,
the analog counterpart of recursive function theory. It is a model of continuous-time
computation inspired by the models of classical physics. In this theory, the discrete
operations of standard recursion theory are replaced by operations on continuous func-
tions such as composition and various forms of diDerential equations like inde%nite
integrals, linear diDerential equations and more general Cauchy problems. Classes of
real recursive functions are de%ned in a manner similar to the standard recursion the-
ory with the aim to study their complexity. Several classes of real recursive functions
are characterized in terms of space complexity. In particular, it is demonstrated that
hierarchies of real recursive classes closed under restricted integration operations are
related to the exponential space hierarchy.
In his paper “The Modal Argument for Hypercomputing Minds,” Selmer Bringsjord
discusses the problem whether the human mind hypercomputes, or merely computes.
There are many informal arguments from GRodel, Lucas, Penrose and others for the
view that, in light of incompleteness theorems, the human mind has powers exceeding
those of Turing machines and their equivalents. All these arguments fail. Their Caws
have been repeatedly exposed in the literature. Bringsjord gives herein a formal modal
argument showing that the approach that equates mind with a computer is false. This
allows him to state that minds are in fact hypercomputers. After this, the author refutes
several objections to this statement and considers diDerent models of super-recursive
algorithms and hypercomputation.
The paper “Hypercomputation by De7nition” by Benjamin Wells discusses algorith-
mic problems of such algebraic structures as pseudorecursive varieties of semigroups
and such logical structures as equational theories of semigroups. Following Alfred
Tarski, the author considers as decidable non-recursive equational theories in which
any subtheory generated by formulas with a %nite number of variables is recursive.
Then a process that makes such theories and corresponding varieties decidable is called
hypercomputation by de%nition. Wells discusses several approaches and mathematical
models that make such theories decidable, suggesting directions for future research.
In her paper “The Concept of Computability,” Carol Cleland attacks Turing ma-
chines from two sides. On one hand, she demonstrates that Turing machine is a far-
reaching idealization of physical systems, and it surpasses such systems in diDerent
aspects. On the other hand, Cleland suggests a possibility of physical computing de-
vices that can do more than Turing machines, thus realizing hypercomputation. Re%ning
the concept of computation is the aim and base of Cleland’s analysis. In developing
this analysis Cleland debates and reconsiders the main principles of the contemporary
theory of algorithms and computation. She brings us to one main conclusion: it is nec-
essary to continue logical and methodological analysis of computer science foundations
to stimulate its growth, and choose the right direction for its development.
The central question behind the reasoning in Cleland’s paper involves how it is
possible that mathematics, in her case, it is the mathematical structure that is called
speci%cally a Turing machine, being so exact and perfect, can be so successfully applied
to the imprecise and imperfect physical world—speci%cally how can an ideal and for-
malized theory inCuence real computers and computation. This question excited many
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outstanding thinkers, including Albert Einstein and Eugene Wigner. One answer is that
mathematics takes its objects from reality, developing images of real things by means
of generalization, idealization, and abstraction (cf., for example, [1] or [12]). However,
the bulk of mathematical knowledge has been created inside mathematics without any
reference to reality. Only later, many of the mathematical concepts and methods have
found applications in the real world. This brings us to another answer to the crucial
question about the miraculous eNciency of mathematics. This approach synthesizes the
teaching of Plato on ideas with that of Aristotle on forms. It results in a new theory of
structures called structurology [6]. From the perspective of structurology, structures of
things and processes determine the essence of these things and processes. Mathematics
is a formalized study of various structures, which includes many structures from the
real world [2]. This is the source of mathematics power.
This is the reason why, in spite of all shortcomings and critique, ordinary Turing
machines will continue to be useful in computer science like Newton’s laws in physics.
The remaining necessity is to determine clear boundaries for applying of such machines
to be models of real systems and processes. The methodological analysis conducted in
papers of Cleland and MacLennan helps to achieve this goal.
In the paper “The Problem of Induction and the Problem of Computation,” Kevin
T. Kelly compares processes of computation in computer science, formal reasoning in
mathematics, and induction in empirical sciences. In formal reasoning and computabil-
ity, %nding the right answer is usually understood to imply halting in a %nite time with
a correct result. Empirical science, on the other hand, is notoriously fallible, because
there is no time by which science can infallibly announce that the law is true. At best,
the truth is arrived at, eventually, with no bell announcing when it has succeeded. Ar-
guments are given that uncomputable formal problems are intuitively, mathematically,
and methodologically analogous to general empirical questions, warranting a similar,
fallible attitude in the formal domain. Kelly argues that a version of Ockham’s razor
(a preference for the simplest answer compatible with experience) is advantageous in
both domains. The analogies imply that when halting with a correct answer is algo-
rithmically infeasible, we may drop the halting requirement in formal reasoning. That
is what is done in empirical reasoning. This idea results in a notion of “hypercom-
putation” based entirely on classical computational models and on methods parallel to
attitudes long familiar in the empirical domain.
Jack Copeland, in his paper “Hypercomputation: Philosophical Issues,” discusses
philosophical issues of hypercomputation. At %rst, he describes some elementary mod-
els of hypercomputation. These abstract machines serve to make the point that com-
putability is a relative notion, not an absolute one. All computation takes place relative
to some set or other of capacities, richer or poorer. The capacities speci%ed by Tur-
ing in 1936 occupy no privileged position. Then Copeland analyzes some objections
to the possibility of hypercomputation and considers in more detail Turing’s oracle
machines or o-machines. The paper concludes with a discussion on some exegetical
issues concerning the writing of Turing and Church.
Emergence of a diversity of computational and hypercomputational models brings us
to an important question. It is whether we can do with computers what it is possible to
do with models. There is no simple answer to this question. The reality here is much
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more complex. Now there are several approaches in this direction. However, without a
sound mathematical base people, even good experts in computer science, cannot make
distinctions nor choose directions better suited for research and application. Hence, it
is important not only to go beyond the Church–Turing thesis, but to do it realistically
and in a grounded way. For example, Turing machines with oracles took computations
far beyond the Church–Turing thesis. But without speci%c restriction on oracles, that
approach also was beyond reason.
The inability to make distinctions fosters misunderstanding and misconceptions:
everything seems the same, although some models are unreasonable and in many cases,
not realizable, while it is possible to embody other models in technological devices.
At the same time, the third class of models may be a useful tool for investigation of
natural system, such as the brain. We can compare the situation with existing models
of super-recursive algorithms and hypercomputation to one when people do not and
cannot distinguish between works of Ziolkowski that gave a theory for space Cights
and novels of Jules Verne that described such Cights in the form of science %ction.
Mathematics can help us to gain understanding of the real situation. In many areas
of mathematics, including theory of algorithms and computation, it models reality. The
mathematical approach can likewise supply means to evaluate correctly super-recursive
algorithms and models of hypercomputation.
First, super-recursive algorithms are mathematical models of computations and com-
puters, although they give only approximate ideal representation of their object domain.
Einstein stated that this in a paradoxical extreme form: as far as the laws of math-
ematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do
not refer to reality. For instance, if we take Turing machine, itself the most popular
model for computation, we see that no real device can have an in%nite memory, even
potentially. Thus, Turing machine is an idealization of real computers. However, this
abstract idealization allows us to %nd many important properties of real computers
This is similar to the situation in science where mathematics often leads to discovery
of new fundamental laws of nature, via approximate images of reality.
Here is an example from physics: The %rst Kepler’s law states:
The planets move round the Sun in ellipses:
When people say or write that the real orbits of planets are ellipses, this is only
approximation to real movement, which is much more complex as planets are inCuenced
not only by the Sun, but also by other planets and, to a less extent, by other cosmic
bodies.
Second important issue of the theory of super-recursive algorithms and hyper-
computation is that computations, computers, and networks can be considered to be
realizations of super-recursive algorithms. Hence, it is possible to ask to what extent it
is possible to realize features of a given class or model of super-recursive algorithms.
Third, super-recursive algorithms provide the core for mathematical models of uti-
lization of computations, computers, and networks. These questions are only at the
beginning of their exploration, both in practice and in theory.
Nevertheless, the situation with super-recursive algorithms is not so simple. James
Gleick in his book “Chaos” [9] cites a physicist at the Georgia Institute of Technology,
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Joseph Ford, who quoted Tolstoy:
“I know that most men, including those at ease with problems of greatest complexity,
can seldom accept even the simplest and most obvious truth if it be such as would
oblige them to admit the falsity of conclusions which they have delighted in explaining
to colleagues, which they have proudly taught to others, and which they have woven,
thread by thread into the fabric of their life.”
So, it is not a surprise that some people object to super-recursive algorithms and
hyper-computation (e.g., [14]). Their main argument is that many have attempted but
nobody accomplished such models that go beyond the Church–Turing thesis. We have
many examples refuting this argument.
One of the most renowned is related to the famous model of a true empirical propo-
sition that is attributed to Aristotle and is obtained by observation and induction:
All swans are white:
Europeans had believed in this until they came to Australia where they found black
swans and understood that the statement of Aristotle is false.
To consider these issues, we have to make a distinction between diDerent types
and kinds of super-recursive algorithms. Analysis of the current situation in the theory
of super-recursive algorithms and hypercomputation shows diDerent aspects of this
theory.
First, the variety of models of super-Turing computations contains models that are
realistic from the point of view of their computer implementation, but they are not
analogues computations or “black box” models. To %nd what is more realistic, what is
less realistic, and what is only a useful abstraction, we need a more detailed, thorough
and extended analysis of all models of super-Turing computations.
Second, there are many models of hypercomputation that are not algorithms, but
only algorithmic or computational schemes. Examples are models of in%nite time and
analogue computations, as well as Turing machines with unrestricted oracles.
Third, it is incorrect to suggest that these schemes are useless. Even ignoring their
utility for the theory of algorithms and computation, we can state that all models
of hypercomputations or super-Turing computations might be useful for information
technology if they are correctly applied to problems of technology.
Now the majority of mathematicians, computer scientists, and philosophers who re-
search problems of computation and algorithms believe that the Church–Turing
thesis is true and Turing machines restricts all possible kinds of computability. How-
ever, we have many examples from the history of mathematics, science, and even
logic that many beliefs that were promoted to the range of empirical laws were later
disproved.
However, not only general statements, but also authoritative theories have been
changed after new discoveries. Newton’s mechanics gives us one of the most impres-
sive examples of such situations in science. For several centuries scientists believed in
universality and omnipotence of Newton’s mechanics. However in the 20th century,
relativity theory and quantum mechanics demonstrated that Newton’s laws, although
being very important, are restricted only to macroscopic phenomena. In the microworld
and in the world of high velocities other laws are valid.
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In a similar way, it is possible to compare some super-recursive algorithms to rela-
tivity theory, which gives better models for high velocities, while other super-recursive
algorithms resemble quantum mechanics, which gives better models for microscopic
processes.
The main problem of the theory of super-recursive algorithms and hypercomputation
is that now there are several approaches in this direction, but without sound mathemat-
ical base people, even good experts in computer science, cannot make distinctions for
these directions. However, it is important not only to go beyond the Church–Turing
thesis, but also to do this realistically and in a grounded manner. For example, Turing
machines with arbitrary oracles take computations far beyond the Church–Turing the-
sis. However, only adequate restrictions on the oracle make such models useful and=or
realistic.
Disability to make distinctions implies misunderstanding and misconceptions: every-
thing seems the same, although for some it is all unreasonable and non-realizable,
while for others it is all important, while trivial. The situation is similar to one when
people do not and cannot make distinctions between mathematical and logical works
of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (Lewis Carrol), his famous books about Alice, and his
poetry.
Making necessary distinctions in the variety of super-recursive algorithms and mod-
els of hypercomputation, we come to the following conclusion. Some of these models
and algorithms reCect essential peculiarities of modern computers, embedded devices,
and networks, providing relevant models for such systems. Some of these models and
algorithms give ideas and methods for weighty advancement of computer technology.
At the same time, others are only theoretical constructions that are aimed at the devel-
opment of strictly theoretical areas of computer science and mathematics.
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